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
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Print



Rina Castelluccio for The New York Times
Hamas, the militant Islamic group, has emerged as the strongest opponent of peace accords between Israel and the P.L.O. Hamas supporters are shown rallying under a wall bearing anti-Israeli graffiti.

○ Hamas had been utilizing
~~political~~ names

such as Izzedin AL-Qassam
for its military; Tawid Society;
for bank accounts; Cultural Society; DAWA

AL-MUJAMA AL-ISLAMIA;
Islamic Association for Palestine

Holy Land Foundation,
AL-MUJAHIDUN AL-FILISTINI

Islamic Jihad. Agent

○ might figured he needed to
bring out what
these names meant
he never had a long reason
by they used these specific
names.

The History of HAMAS.

But where did
Hamas come from
what is its history?
Hamas is an extension
of the Muslim Brotherhood.
If it only came into
existence in 1987?
How was it able to
organize & finance
such terrorism.



Hamas, the militant Islamic group, has emerged as the
Israel and the P.L.O. Hamas supporters are shown rally

Alms and Arms: Tact

By JOHN KIFNER

JERUSALEM, March 14 — Ha-
mas, the main force behind the
suicide bombers who have thrown
the shaky Middle East peace talks
into crisis, is an organization with
deep roots, a popular base that
feeds on misery and resentment,
an international support network,
and a clear goal: to turn the na-
scent Palestine into an Islamic
state.

Mosques, hospitals and schools
are its weapons as much as
bombs, and Yasir Arafat, as much
as Israel, is its target. 76-81

As world leaders united this
week in a show of anti-terrorist
resolve, even the experts who
study groups like Hamas say the
nature of the organization
presents a daunting quandary: Do
you attempt to co-opt the religious
and civilian side, thus isolating the
militants, as Mr. Arafat has
sought to do? Or do you seek to
crush Hamas whole, as Mr. Ara-
fat's American and Israeli part-
ners are now pressing him to do?

ROOTS OF TERROR A special report.

No one knows as we
that either method can
In the 1970's and the
Palestinian uprising,
lowed the surging Isla-
ment to flourish and ev-
supported it, calculating
him groups would under-
draw support from M
P.L.O., which was their
immediate target.

The tactic failed. Ha-
its tight-knit cells and
Islam, proved much in-
fluence and influence
Arafat's more secular
P.L.O.

But cracking down
more successful. In 1
attempt to decimate Ha-
el deported 45 of its ac-
snowy hillside in Leban-
Many of the report
enrolled in guerrilla
camps, and returned to

beginning
6-81

US. Did
nothing
to stop
Yet American
authorities were doing
little to stop Hamas
leaders & financing
US soft

②
TAT



Rina Castelnovo for The New York Times

e militant Islamic group, has emerged as the strongest opponent of peace accords between the P.L.O. Hamas supporters are shown rallying under a wall bearing anti-Israeli graffiti.

is and Arms: Tactics in a Holy War

JOHN KIFNER

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ROOTS OF TERROR A special report.

~~No one knows as well as Israel that either method can backfire. In the 1970's and early in the Palestinian uprising, Israel allowed the surging Islamic movement to flourish and even covertly supported it, calculating that Muslim groups would undermine and draw support from Mr. Arafat's P.L.O., which was then the more immediate threat.~~

The tactic failed. Hamas, with its tight-knit cells and devotion to Islam, proved much harder to infiltrate and influence than Mr. Arafat's more secular and corrupt P.L.O. 1988

But cracking down was hardly more successful. In 1992, in an attempt to decimate Hamas, Israel deported 415 of its activists to a snowy hillside in Lebanon. 92

Many of the deported militants enrolled in guerrilla training camps, and returned to Israel with

their grievances and their skills honed to a fine edge.

indeed, it was the assassination of Hamas's chief bomb-maker that brought the latest wave of suicide bombings, breaking a seven-month lull in terror attacks.

Hamas, the major Islamic militant organization, is linked to three of the four suicide bombings in the last two weeks that have left 62 people dead, including the bombers, and now looms as the gravest immediate threat to a Middle East peace. Killing Hamas terrorists

Many who study the group fear proponents of peace — Israel, Mr. Arafat, and the others who joined hands at the anti-terrorism conference Wednesday in Egypt — are again in danger of outsmarting themselves by misjudging Hamas.

Although its organization and military operations are deliberately murky, interviews with a wide range of Palestinian, Israeli and Western experts present a portrait of Hamas that is more cohesive

Continued on Page A6, Column 4

and intricate than is generally believed.

Most of Hamas's estimated \$70 million annual budget goes to support a network of hundreds of mosques, schools, orphanages, clinics and hospitals that permeates virtually every village, town and refugee camp on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. But these social services provide both a cover and a recruiting ground for young terrorists. One of the important uses of charitable donations to Hamas is to provide lifetime annuities to the families of suicide bombers.

Hamas receives financial and other support from an array of sources, including Iran, Palestinians living in America and Europe, and prominent figures in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf states. Much of the money is channeled through neighboring Jordan where the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood is strong.

Attempts to behead Hamas by arresting or killing its leaders have tended to spawn revenge attacks and produce more radical new leaders. Mohammed Mousa Abu Marzook, now in custody in New York, came to power after a roundup of other leaders, and virtually reinvented Hamas as the financial and military organization that carried out the post-Oslo attacks on Israel.

Efforts to counter Hamas are hampered, too, by family loyalties and shared experiences of battling Israel, including prison time. One example: Mr. Arafat is under extremely heavy pressure from the Americans to arrest Mohammed Dief, the current Hamas military chief, who has been operating from Gaza. The policeman in charge of the search, Col. Mohammed Dahlan of Mr. Arafat's security service, is a childhood friend of Mr. Dief and fellow inmate of Israeli jails who has been seen sipping coffee with the wanted man during the recent wave of bombings.

Currently, there appear to be tactical divisions within Hamas, with the leadership based abroad pressing for more attacks and some leaders in Gaza and the West Bank willing to accept a truce, at least for the short term, in order to protect the mosques and charity institutions that form their political base. But it is unclear if these differences can be exploited, because underlying the tactics is a common goal: the ouster of Mr. Arafat and the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state.

Above all, Hamas thrives on misery and frustration. The harsh Israeli blockade of Palestinian areas, along with flaws in the hastily organized peace plan and disappointment with Mr. Arafat's rule, which has brought little improvement in the lives of Palestinians, will only strengthen Hamas.

Shows leaders from
outside control
inside via \$

3
12/1

The Origins

Roots in Charity And Religious Zeal

The militant Islamic movement here, like many in the Arab world, traces its roots to the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt during the 1920's by Hassan al-Bana. The brotherhood has strong followings in Egypt and Jordan today, and has spawned movements in other countries. *secretly*

Typically, the Brotherhood's strategy is to fight what it sees as Westernization and corruption of Arab governments by running its own schools, hospitals and other services in order to spread its beliefs.

Sheik Ahmed Yassin and the other founders of Hamas were Muslim Brotherhood followers running welfare, social and educational services through their mosques when the Palestinian uprising broke out against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987.

Stone-throwing youths flocked to the P.L.O. banner and the rival Islamic Holy War taunted the Brotherhood for inaction. Fearful of losing his following to the P.L.O., Sheik Yassin formed a new organization naming it Hamas, an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, which means "zeal." Its military wing was called the Ezzadin al-Qassem brigade, after a Muslim preacher in Haifa who led an Arab revolt against both British rule and Zionist settlement in the 1930's, dying in battle.

Ironically, the Israeli authorities had quietly supported the Islamic movements, both during the 1970's and in the early days of the uprising, in hopes of undermining the nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

"There was a conscious decision to build up the Islamic groups as a counterweight to the P.L.O. and to increase divisions within Palestinian society," said a long-serving Western diplomat. "The Ministry of Defense gave the okay for all these Islamic institutions which became the financial and institutional infrastructure behind the Qassem brigades. These institutions were allowed to flourish and function and this has come back in a terrible way to haunt the Israelis."

Hamas swiftly became a problem, and in 1989 the Sheik Yassin was thrown into an Israeli jail where he has remained ever since. A further wave of arrests was meant to decimate the leadership but failed, and in December, 1992, Israel deported 415 Hamas activists, dumping them on a barren, snowy hillside in Lebanon.

76-81

87

Start of Hamas

87

Israel
Supported
PLO 70's
+
Hamas 80's

YASSIN Arrest
89

92 Deportation
415

④
10/1

The arrest of Sheik Yassin and other leaders brought to power a lower ranking activist, Mohammed Mousa Abu Marzook, who was to substantially change the organization.

Described by those who know him as an ambitious, charismatic figure, Mr. Marzook reorganized the structure of Hamas, Israeli and Palestine intelligence officials say, setting up outside fund-raising channels and concentrating virtually all political, financial and military power in his own hands.

Mr. Marzook operated ~~from~~ from the United States, ~~living in~~ in Springfield, Va., where he was active in an Islamic organization called the United Association for Studies and Research. He then set up a major Hamas support office in Amman, Jordan until, under American pressure, the authorities expelled him in early 1995, after two suicide bombers killed 21 Israelis, most of them soldiers at a bus stop.

With the Oslo accords in the fall of 1993, the situation here had changed dramatically. While Mr. Arafat's followers prepared to take over Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hamas and Islamic Holy War launched a wave of suicide car bombings, kidnappings and shootings that have killed some 213 Israelis since the peace was signed, far more than in the troubled years of the uprising.

After leaving Jordan, Mr. Marzook traveled between Damascus and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, among other places. On July 28 of last year, he landed at Kennedy Airport in New York on a flight from London, and an immigration inspector spotted his name on a computer watch list of suspected terrorists. He has been held since at the Federal Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan as Israel presses for his extradition.

His place as the leader of the "outside" Hamas leadership, although apparently not all of his power, has been taken by his former deputy Mr. Alami. He is said to operate primarily from Damascus, although he also travels to Teheran.

by Mr. Marzook that channel funds from abroad to Hamas are still intact. The Israelis estimate that roughly 95 per cent of the estimated \$70-million a year goes into such charities as hospitals, clinics and schools, with only a small portion siphoned off to pay for weapons and military operations.

One charitable activity, however, is vital to the military operations: the support payments granted to the families of suicide bombers and others killed in clashes with Israel. These stipends are believed to play an important role in recruiting. Last week, Israel put the director of an Israeli Arab charity under house arrest, charging he had channeled millions of shekels to the families of Hamas guerrillas.

"This is the most critical part," an Israeli Army officer said. "They have to make sure these families are taken care of."

Israeli officials say that among the key Hamas fund-raising operations are the Holy Land Foundation of Richardson, Texas and the London-based Palestine and Lebanon Relief Fund, known, for its telex address, as Interpal. Other money, they say, comes from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, both from Moslem charities and wealthy individuals.

Marzook starts rise to power.
1989

while residing in the US.

When did Marzook start receiving \$10,000,000

while living in Ruston, LA & later to Springfield, VA

Short Summary of Marzook

1995

Arrest at JFK

Marzook replacement in 1995 after arrest worked from Damascus & traveled to Teheran.

Moving money into U.S. + G.S. TO support organizations & Suicide Bombers families.

U.S. organizations that help w/ fundraising (money laundering)

5

much of the money, both Palestinian and Israeli intelligence officers say, is funneled through Jordan, where Hamas maintains an operation headed by Ibrahim Ghosheh, a Jordanian citizen, and a fund called the Islamic Aid Committee. In Amman, Hamas operates in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has become a political force with a sizable representation in Parliament and municipal offices. Funds are smuggled across the three bridges over the Jordan River or transferred between banks or money changers.

Iran, operating primarily through its embassy in Iran, where it deals with the Lebanese Party of God and Palestinian factions opposed to the peace agreements, has also given money to Hamas, the intelligence officers say, although adding that Hamas in the past has been wary of political direction from Teheran.

In Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas operates on several levels.

One involves what are known as Dawa activities — from the Arabic word for the call to prayer. These include the issuance of pamphlets and staging of ceremonies to spread Islamic doctrine.

The major effort, employing hundreds of people, is the social and welfare network. These include the Medical and Scientific Association, which runs hospitals and clinics where only a nominal fee is charged, and the Sciences and Culture Association, which runs Islamic schools. There is a Y.M.C.A.-like Young Islamic Association where boys can play soccer and learn martial arts, and an Islamic Cultural Center for Women, some of whose members have lately been complaining that girls do not get a chance to be suicide bombers.

An organization of some 164 clerics, outlawed by Israel, called the Council of Religious Sages, coordinates sermons so that

similar political messages come from the mosques. Tape cassettes circulating of recent sermons bear such titles as: "P.L.O. high treason: Oslo and beyond."

All of this has been open and public. The military operations of the Qassem brigades are by nature clandestine. They are believed to be coordinated by what is known as the "Inside Committee" headed by Mr. Alami. Some directives, by telephone or fax, are passed through private telephone switching businesses in Cyprus.

But there had been no bombings or other attacks here since last Aug. 21, when a bus in Jerusalem was blown up, killing six people and wounding more than 100. That was only a month after Mr. Abu Marzook, who tightly controlled operations, was taken into custody at Kennedy Airport, suggesting this disrupted the leadership. At the same time, Mr. Arafat was seeking to draw leaders in Gaza to him, persuading one key figure, Emad Falaji, to cross over.

"Arafat was gradually, successfully neutralizing the Hamas leadership," said Khalil Shikaki, a respected Palestinian polling expert who is also the brother of the slain leader of Islamic Holy War. "There was internal dissent, turmoil among them. The total lack of response to their call for a boycott of elections was a blow to their prestige and credibility. Some, as long as their infrastructure was safe, might be willing to trade off the military."

— maybe initially now? self supporting financially.

— Pamphlets
Dr. P. which opened Milwaukee Bank Account.

No bombings after Marzooks arrest. This disrupted leadership after arrest.

may trade-off military to retain infrastructure of schools & hospitals.
Living abroad
financially - schools & hospitals

1988

The Rivals

A Challenger To the P.L.O.

Call Hamas
"Hamas is much better organized than the P.L.O. ever was," said a Western official closely monitoring the situation. "Their leadership has outsmarted Arafat. Their goals are to destroy the Labor government, destroy the P.L.O., destroy the peace process."

"Hamas supporters cross both tribal patterns and family patterns among Palestinians," he added, outlining what he described as "an incredible crisis" for Mr. Arafat. "It's not unusual for the same family to have brothers in different organizations. Many of the P.L.O. people were fighting shoulder to shoulder during the intifada with people from the military wing of Hamas."

\$
Nor is Hamas operating in a vacuum. It has strong support from Islamic movements in neighboring countries, including Jordan, which both Palestinian and Israeli intelligence officers say is the main conduit of smuggled money and directives, and financial backing from Iran.

Hassan Habibi, the vice president of Iran, met in Damascus during the week between the two Jerusalem bus bombings with Emad al-Alami, a 40-year old engineer from Gaza who is the main leader of Hamas, and Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, the leader of Islamic Holy War, the other main Islamic group mounting terror attacks in Israel, as well as leaders of the Lebanese Party of God, according to Western intelligence reports. The meeting, held in the Iranian Embassy, was to discuss future tactics.

Mr. Habibi was accompanied by Hussein Sheikholeslam, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official who was among the hostage-takers at the American Embassy in Teheran in 1979 and whose duties include spreading Islamic revolution, according to the intelligence reports. Money changed hands at the meeting, according to the reports.

"The Islamic resistance movement is in for a glorious future," Mr. Sheikholeslam told the Iranian news service, I.R.N.A., after the meeting. "There is no peaceful solution. The Israelis must return to the countries they came from."

Mr. Arafat had been attempting, with some apparent success, to co-opt Hamas's political leadership, appointing some of its preachers to key posts, among other things. In December, with Israeli approval, he met with Hamas leaders in Cairo to work out a reconciliation. The intransigence of Hamas leaders from abroad blocked a hoped-for written statement, but there was a verbal agreement that Hamas would not launch any attacks that would embarrass Mr. Arafat's Palestinian Authority, a promise broken after the killing, presumably by Israeli security, of Hamas's military leader in January.

But now, under severe pressure from Israel and the United States, — including a visit from a high-ranking Central Intelligence Agency delegation — Mr. Arafat has launched a public crackdown on the Hamas infrastructure, rounding up some 600 of the usual suspects among public Hamas figures, replacing fiery sheiks in some 40 Gaza mosques with his own more conciliatory preachers and sending his police, trailed by television cameras, kicking down the doors of what turned out to be a kindergarten.

A Hamas bomb-maker's monument in Gaza was bulldozed by masked men, and Palestinian police displayed captured weap-

ons, bombs and documents they said described a Hamas plot to overthrow Mr. Arafat.


But Israeli officials are skeptical of how long the Hamas people will stay in jail, and Palestinian officials declared that Mr. Dief and other fugitives, if caught, would not be extradited.

"These people must be rooted out ruthlessly," a Western official said of Hamas. "We pleaded and begged and warned Arafat that the militants were going to do him in, but he chose to co-opt rather than confront. He hasn't been able to realize that these people have a totally different agenda, to destroy the peace process."

But it remains unclear to many experts whether an all-out attack on the civil and well as military activities of Hamas is realistic or even the best way to reduce future terrorism.

"Islamic Holy War is weak, and, if Arafat chooses, it could be eradicated within a few days," Brig. Gen. Yaacov Amidor of Israeli military intelligence told a parliamentary committee, "but Hamas is difficult to get rid of. You can trim its branches, but you can't pull out its roots."

7
121



Home-Grown Roots and Foreign Support

Hamas is a mass movement with solid support among perhaps 15 percent to 20 percent of the two million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Leadership is divided between those inside the territories and those operating outside.

of its estimated \$70 million annual budget coming from the oil-rich Gulf states and another 35 percent from Europe, mainly England, and the United States, according to Israeli estimates. Most of this

Rina Castelnuovo for the New York Times

Children studying verses from the Koran at an Islamic school founded and paid for by Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The young and the needy are the beneficiaries of the tightly woven organization, just as the Israelis have been its victims.

(8)
10/21

The Reprisals

A Shadow War Erupts Into Open

The pause in bombings was to end in the wake of two dramatic assassinations of Islamic terrorist leaders. Smiling Israeli officials pointedly did not deny responsibility.

The first to be killed was Fathi Shikaki, Islamic Holy War leader, in Malta on Oct. 26. As he sauntered out of the luxury hotel where he was registered under a false name as a Libyan businessman, a gunman calmly pumped several shots from a silenced 9-millimeter pistol into his head, then sped away on the back of a waiting motorcycle.

The second was yet more spectacular. Yahya Ayyash, the chief Hamas bomb-maker known as the Engineer, was in his hiding place in Gaza on the morning of Jan 5. He took a call from his father on a cell phone, which suddenly exploded. This killing was widely attributed to Israel's internal security service, Shin Bet, which had been smarting over its failure to protect Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin from an assassin last fall; the day after Mr. Ayyash's death, the director of the secret agency submitted his long-expected resignation, after having partially recouping his agency's prestige.

At the time, there was widespread expectation on both sides that the killings would

prompt revenge attacks. "Of course there will be revenge against Israel," said Mahmoud al-Zahar, the Hamas political leader in Gaza. "The principles of the Hamas movement command us not to lose Palestinian blood without revenge."

The bombings to avenge Mr. Ayyash, Palestinian and Israeli intelligence operatives believe, were organized by Hassan Salami, known as Abu Ahmed, who had left Gaza to escape arrest during the uprising. He received training in Sudan, which under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi has become a gathering place for Islamic revolutionaries, including veterans of the Afghan guerrilla movement eager to continue their struggle. He is believed to have infiltrated into Gaza — where most of the bombings have been planned — through Syria.

"He is a very dangerous guy," an Israeli officer said. "Young, but dangerous."

Mr. Salami recruited Mohammed Abu Warda — who was captured by the Palestinian police, sentenced to life imprisonment within 24 hours and confessed on Israeli television — in the West Bank town of

Engineer killed
Buwadallah took place
Close Associate of Solah,
SARSOUR & Remohi.

rare Business.

50 grams of Explosive,

Revenge
Explosive

1996
Remohi
Centre

9

101

Funeral

Ramallah. He, in turn, found three young suicide bombers. They were equipped simply, with old Egyptian-issue land mines dug up from the Sinai desert, carried in a duffle bag, wired to nine-volt batteries. They passed unnoticed in Israeli army uniforms, with one wearing an earring for extra authenticity.

The last bombing on Tel Aviv's Dizengoff Street was carried out by Islamic Holy War, with the bomber being smuggled out of Gaza in an Israeli Arab's truck past a lax military checkpoint. An Islamic Holy War statement issued in Beirut said it would be "one of a series" to avenge Mr. Shikaki.

The funeral of Mr. Ayyash demonstrated Mr. Arafat's political problems. Over 100,000 people swarmed through Gaza's fetid streets, carrying Mr. Ayyash's coffin, screaming "Death to Israel. We are all Yahya Ayyash, we are all Ezzadin Qassem" and scattering baseball card-like pictures of the Hamas military leader. He was a folk hero and legends were told of his exploits and escapes, sometimes disguised as a woman, an old man, or an Orthodox Jew. When he emerged unscathed from the accl-

idental demolition of one of his own bomb factories, he was said to have been guarded by angels.

Mr. Arafat visited the bereaved family, declared Mr. Ayyash a "holy martyr," ordered a 21-gun salute and sent ranking members of his Palestinian authority to the funeral. Reporters spotted at least 10 wanted terrorists in the crowd, including Mr. Dief.

In effect, said a European diplomat well-versed in the area, Mr. Arafat has begun to reproduce in Gaza the atmosphere of his days in Beirut, with an administration marked by inefficiency, corruption and cronyism, trying to keep all power to himself while juggling various warlords, including half a dozen paramilitary police agencies, the armed Islamic militants and criminal hands that control their own turf for narcotics and car theft operations.

"This is a fight for the very nature of Palestinian society," said Emmanuel Sivan, an Israeli expert on Islamic militancy. It is posed for Hamas, he said, in rhyming Arabic contrasts — *usuliyya*, meaning a righteous Islam, and *wusuliyya*, connoting the

Funeral

decadent life of the nouveau rich. And they add the new term *jahalliyya*, meaning a pre-Islamic state of barbarism and ignorance. The word is used by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to sanction revolt against Arab rulers they regarded as Westernized and corrupt.

While other Palestinians frolicked on the Gaza Strip's sandy beaches after the Israeli withdrawal, Hamas supporters were appalled at the mixed bathing. When not fighting Israel, they may busy themselves cutting the wires to television satellite dishes.

"Arafat was trying to co-opt Hamas with classic divide-and-rule tactics and he was having success. He made a truce with them," he said. "But now they have betrayed him. His dilemma is that he has no other option but to move against them. But should they retaliate against the Palestinian Authority there could be armed struggle in the streets."

Mr. Shikaki, the polling expert whose research had shown a sharp decline in support for violence among Palestinians over the last year, offered a similarly gloomy assessment of the immediate future.

If Mr. Arafat "goes against the mosques, he would be making enemies of a large part of the Palestinian population. Gaza and the West Bank could be turned into another Algeria. People will be asking 'What kind of an Authority do we have, what kind of peace?'"

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121